

Theme Summary: Countering Security Threats to Space Flight & Ground Systems

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2013 Space Operations Workshop
June 12, 2013

The logo for Applied Physics Laboratory (APL) at Johns Hopkins University, consisting of the letters 'APL' in a large, bold, red, sans-serif font.

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Countering Security Threats

- Oversight
 - Guidance
 - Manage Risk
 - Secure Practices
 - Strong Controls
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- Adding security to legacy systems
 - Replace crunchy outside, soft inside with
 - Layered Security
 - Defense in Depth
 - Make the center more chewy

Securing Ground Systems

- Security Infrastructure
 - User Management
 - Log Server
 - Screen Lock
 - Application Security
- Encryption, Authentication
- Key Management

- Impact on performance

Information Security Management System

IT Security

- ISO 2700[0,1,2,5]
 - ISO/IEC 27000:2009, Information security management systems — Overview and vocabulary
 - ISO/IEC 27001:2005, Information security management systems — Requirements
 - ISO/IEC 27005:2011, Information security risk management
- NIST Standards SP 800 series
 - NIST SP 800-30 Rev.1, Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments
 - NIST SP 800-39, Managing Information Security Risk
 - NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4, Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations
 - NIST SP 800-61, Computer Security Incident Handling Guide
 - NIST SP 800-64, Security Considerations in Information System Development Life Cycle

Security Policy / Info and Comms Security

- DLR / German Space Operations Center
- ESA Mission Operations Infrastructure
- ISO 27001
- Space Segment
- Ground Segment
- Interoperability of Ground Segments
- Keep documents up to date
- Live the documents
- Continuous Security Improvement
- Is it too much overhead?
 - Integrate with Quality System?
 - Cost of doing / Cost of not doing

Secure Software Engineering

- The last line of defense
- Secure Software Development Lifecycle (SSDLC)
- Generic Application Security Framework
- Requirements
 - Functional
 - Assurance
- Confidentiality/Integrity/Availability

Space Link Security

- EUMETSAT and ESA
- Encryption / Authentication
- Cost / Benefit / Risk
- Space Mission Security Architecture
- Data Link Layer
 - CCSDS Space Data Link Security (SDLS) protocol
- Physical Layer
 - Spread Spectrum Modulation
 - Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum CDMA Enhancements

Security Primitives for Packetized Data Links

- Using CCSDS DTN Bundle Protocol
- Simplified Bundle Security Protocol
- Packetized Data
- Multi-Hop
- Multi-Path
- DTN Overlay network
- Focus on End to End
 - Integrity, Confidentiality
 - Decouple Routing from Security
- Encapsulation
- Deployment Considerations

Space Situational Awareness / Metrics

- Visualization
 - Layered model with dependencies
- Drill down from S/C to MOC and Ground Software
- Network Monitoring

- How do you measure system and mission effectiveness?
- Mission Essential Functions
- Use Cases
- System Measures of Effectiveness
- Mission Measures of Effectiveness
- System Model and Evaluator

Theme Summary

- Security requirements are not going away
 - They are increasing substantially
 - They are likely to be with us for a long time
- We have to adapt legacy systems
- Security should be incorporated at the system level
 - Ground, Space, Link
 - Interoperability will grow
- We have to engineer our software and our systems with security in mind
- We have to do this without additional budget